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Comparative Environmental Law and Orientalism: Reading Beyond the ÔTextÕ of 
Traditional Knowledge Protection.   
(accepted for publication) 
 
Abstract 
This paper uses traditional knowledge as a case study to address multiple discussions 
in the field of comparative law. First, it addresses the theoretical challenge about the 
role of comparative law as a critical research tool in the development of 
environmental law. Second, within the context of transnational legal processes, it 
questions to what extent comparative law as a method can further the relationship 
between different levels of law making by distinctive legal actors. It is timely to bring 
mainstream comparative law into conversation with critical perspectives from other 
disciplines such as postcolonial theory and poststructuralism when studying non-
Western law. These issues have been firmly placed on the research agenda of 
comparative law scholars for quite a few years but studying these questions from the 
perspective of traditional knowledge brings a new outlook to these debates.  
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Introduction 
 
The problem when looking into the protection of traditional knowledge is the 
diversity of potentially applicable laws. It is international environmental law that first 
drew the attention to the precarious situation when the Convention on Biological 
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Diversity (CBD) recognised the importance of traditional knowledge for indigenous 
peoples and local communities. Since then, a plethora of international environmental 
law instruments have recognised the significance of traditional knowledge for 
indigenous peoples and local communities.
1
 Besides international environmental law 
instruments there are also human rights implements that are protecting traditional 
knowledge from misappropriation.
2
 A third option to protect traditional knowledge 
can be found in the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), where since 
2001 negotiations have been ongoing on intellectual property and traditional 
knowledge.
3
 Given the diversity of international law, there is no (uniform) definition 
of traditional knowledge, and the problem of how to protect traditional knowledge is 
not dealt with in a uniform way and often the law that is ultimately applicable is 
national law, bounded by territory. Besides binding laws, there is a whole plethora of 
other normative orders - some formal and recognised, others informal and 
unrecognised Ð that are trying to find a more equitable, fair and respectful solution for 
protecting traditional knowledge. Whilst these alternative rules and norms are diverse, 
one of the most important ones is indigenous peoplesÕ customs, mostly referred to as 
customary law.  
 
																																																						
1
 Reference to traditional knowledge can be found in the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21 (Chapter 26 is on 
indigenous peoples, chapter 32 on local farmers and indigenous peoples are also mentioned in chapter 
15 on the protection of biological diversity and uses identical wording to Article 8(j) to the CBD. For 
more details see Agenda 21, Conference of the United Nations on Environment and Development, 
Annex 2 (UN Doc. A/CONF.15 1/26/Rev.1), Vol. 1 (1993)); The Forest Principles (Principle 12(d) of 
the Forest Principles stresses the importance of benefit sharing and Principle 2(d) and 5(e) also stress 
that benefits of traditional ways of living and emphasises the various needs and	economic and cultural 
interests of indigenous and local groups); and international binding agreements such as the CBD and 
the Convention to Combat Desertification (relevant Articles in the Convention to Combat 
Desertification are Article 17(c), Article 18 and Article 19). 
2
 Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal peoples in Independent Countries of the 
International Labour Organisation and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples are the main international instruments. 
3
 WIPO through its Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC), regulates intellectual property issues emerging from the 
use of traditional knowledge. 
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We are dealing here with a methodological problem at multiple levels. First, there are 
multiple layers of formal and non-formal rules and norms dealing with traditional 
knowledge. Second, customary law is not always well-defined and recognised in 
national and international law and therefore lacks a legally binding quality. This 
makes traditional knowledge a case study par excellence for comparative lawyers 
interested in studying the changing nature of comparative law when focusing on 
cross-cultural legal comparisons. It sits within a wider debate about the widening of 
comparative lawÕs theoretical ambition which is part of a broader awakening that 
comparative law as a method is more than just comparing legal rules, technical 
reforms, legal institutions and professional legal practices; more attention is placed on 
the wider socio-legal context that shapes the meaning of law.
4
 Furthermore, the paper 
also responds to the request that environmental law pays a bigger role in challenging 
the methodological approaches in comparative studies.
5
  
 
This paper, therefore, uses traditional knowledge as a case study to address multiple 
discussions in the field of comparative law. First, it addresses the theoretical 
challenge about the role of comparative law as a critical research tool in the 
development of environmental law. Second, within the context of transnational legal 
processes, it questions to what extent comparative law as a method can further the 
relationship between different levels of law making by distinctive legal actors. It is 
timely to bring mainstream comparative law into conversation with critical 
perspectives from other disciplines such as postcolonial theory and legal pluralism 
																																																						
4
 R. Cotterrell, Comparative Sociology of Law. Queen Mary University of London, School of Law. 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 96/2011. Electronic copy available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1971611 
5
 J. Darp and A. Nilsson, ÔOn the Comparison of Environmental LawÕ 3 Journal of Court Innovation 
(2010), 315-336 at 316. 
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when studying non-Western law.
6
 These issues have been firmly placed on the 
research agenda of comparative law scholars for quite a few years
7
 but studying these 
questions from the perspective of traditional knowledge brings a new outlook to these 
debates.  
 
First, it contributes to ongoing discussions about the meaning and definition of legal 
culture by drawing upon legal pluralism as a critical lens to reflect upon the meaning 
of legal culture. Second, the functional comparison of different legal frameworks to 
protect traditional knowledge opens up the debate about the hierarchical ordering of 
law making. Through a post-colonial theoretical lens questions can be raised to what 
extent comparative law as a method is well equipped to give voice to non-Western 
legal processes from an epistemological and ontological point of view. After all, 
comparative law as a discipline has been criticised for being orthodox and even 
comparatists themselves have argued that comparative lawyers approach law as a 
positivistic ÔscienceÕ. Orthodox comparative lawyers study what is law and what 
counts as binding law in a given jurisdiction describing neutrally, objectively, 
logically and scientifically the law in force.
8
 But Pierre Legrand questions to what 
extent comparatists pay respect and recognise the law of the ÔotherÕ. Understanding 
particular legal problems requires a deeper reading of the historical, political, social, 
demographic and epistemological reasons behind specific legal rules.
9
   
 
																																																						
6
 T. Ruskola, ÔLegal OrientalismÕ, 101 Michigan Law Review (2002), 179-234, at 181. 
7
 See e.g. D. Nelken & J. Feest (eds), Adapting Legal Cultures (Oxford, hart Publishing, 2001); D. 
Nelken (ed), Using Legal Culture (London, Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Publishing, 2012). 
8
 P. Legrand, ÔSiting Foreign Law: How Derrida Can HelpÕ, 21 Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law (2011), 595-629, at 598. 
9
 P. Legrand, n. 8 above, at 601. 
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The paper starts with a genealogy of the meaning of legal culture in comparative law, 
moving next to a close reading of the work of Pierre Legrand and his engagement 
with Jacques DerridaÕs deconstruction of law as text. The paper then focuses on a 
functional comparison between international, regional and national laws dealing with 
the protection of traditional knowledge. The final part of the paper reflects on the 
methodological challenges comparative law is facing when dealing with non-Western 
legal systems opening up the debate about the value of difference and the voice of the 
ÔotherÕ in environmental law making and the protection of traditional knowledge.  
 
As explained in more detail below, the cultural turn in comparative law studies 
requires a different method when comparing different legal systems. The act of 
comparison is perceived to be a political activity embedded in local contexts. 
However, the latter reaches far beyond an understanding of the differences between 
legal systems on the basis of a historical, political, and social dimension; it requires a 
better understanding of the legal context in which norms are adopted, amended and 
applied.
10
 This requires studying the legal culture of the rules and norms that are 
currently in place to protect traditional knowledge. So while the paper engages with a 
functional comparison between the different international, national, regional and local 
legislations, this comparison serves as a platform from which to study cross-cultural 
legal contexts and to engage critically with the methodological challenges 
comparative law faces when studying across legal cultures.  
 
 
 
																																																						
10
 P. Legrand, ÔComparative Legal Studies and Commitment to TheoryÕ, 58 Modern Law Review 
(1995), 262Ð273, at 262; P. Legrand, ÔHow to Compare Now (1996) 16 legal Studies (1996), 232Ð242, 
at 232; S. Millns, n. 10 above, at 292.  
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Genealogy of Legal Culture 
 
In an attempt to engage on a more theoretical level with the question how to compare 
legal systems, comparative law has experienced a cultural turn under auspices of 
scholars like Pierre Legrand,
11
 David Nelken
12
 and Csaba Varga.
13
 The cultural turn 
has been inspired by previous studies on legal cultures such as the socio-legal 
approach of Lawrence Friedman
14
 and the critical reflections advocated in the legal 
theory of the post-modern legal scholar Gnther Frankenberg.
15
 Frankenberg 
criticised the functional approach in comparative law for giving a false sense of 
neutrality. According to Frankenberg, it is impossible to find a point of view from 
which to compare different legal rules in a neutral way. Furthermore, he questions the 
usefulness to compare just the legal rules, particularly since legal institutions are 
embedded in a wider social context which should be part of the legal comparative 
enquiry. Legal scholarsÕ attention to culture has a longer history with roots in the 
Western Romanticism movement of the 18
th
 century.  Romanticists reacted against 
the rationalisation and universalization of science during the Enlightenment and 
pleaded for a return to history, emotions and nature in science and philosophy, 
including law.  
 
																																																						
11
 P. Legrand, n. 10 above 
12
 D. Nelken, ÔDisclosing/Invoking Legal Culture: An IntroductionÕ 4 Social and Legal Studies (1995), 
435Ð452; D. Nelken,ÔUsing the Concept of Legal CultureÕ 9 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy  
(2004), 1Ð26. 
13
 V. Csaba, ÔLegal Traditions? In Search for Families and Cultures of LawÕ 
46 Acta Juridica Hungarica (2005), 177Ð197; V. Csaba, ÔComparative Legal Cultures. Renewal by 
Transforming into a Genuine DisciplineÕ 48 Acta Juridica Hungarica (2007), 95Ð113. 
14
 L. Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective (Russell Sage Foundation, 1975); L. 
Friedman, ÔIs there a Modern Legal Culture?Õ, 7 Ratio Juris (1994), at 117.  
15
 G. Frankenberg, ÔCritical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative LawÕ, 26 Harvard International 
Law Journal (1985), 411Ð456. 
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The concept of legal culture is characterised by three distinctive approaches and 
theoretical genealogies.
16
 The first one has its roots firmly in comparative law and 
studies legal families and traditions and how they develop and cluster together. 
Initially, legal families were distinguished from a Western point of view and three 
main legal families were distinguished: Roman-Germanic law, common law and the 
socialist family. These main families have also been adopted in former colonies and 
after decolonisation most African countries, for example, kept the European laws of 
their rulers. However, comparative law has significantly moved on from this tradition 
and have developed a far more sophisticated view of the Ôworld map of lawÕ in 
distinctive ways.
17
 For example, the classification in three legal families is seen as an 
approximation and comparatists are now thinking in more dynamic terms about legal 
traditions and legal cultures to emphasise the interaction between the different legal 
families, traditions and cultures.
18
 A good example of this more advanced thinking is 
Ugo MatteiÕs work on legal taxanomies as a reaction against the Euro-American 
classification and proposes a classification based on a deeper understanding and 
reaction to social dynamics in the areas of professional law, political law and 
traditional law.
19
  
 
Western legal culture distinguishes itself through its emphasis on individualism and 
rationalism. Non-western legal cultures, on the other hand, are neither individualistic 
nor rationalist. At the risk of overgeneralising, in non-western legal cultures, law is 
not separated from religion and morals and often law is not conceived as rational 
																																																						
16
 S. E. Merry, ÔWhat is Legal Culture? An Anthropological PerspectiveÕ, in D. Nelken (ed.) n. 7, 52-
76, at 58.  
17
 Mathias Reimann, ÔThe Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the 
Twentieth CenturyÕ 50 The American Journal of Comparative Law (2002), 671-700, at 676. 
18
 ibid., at 677-678 
19
 Ugo Mattei, ÔThree Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the WorldÕs Legal SystemsÕ, 45 The 
American Journal of Comparative Law (1997), 5-44. 
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system of strict rules and norms, but rather as a means of social control in order to 
restore or keep peace in the community.
20
  
 
For some scholars, it is almost a futile exercise to compare the legal rules and 
institutions of the different legal cultures given their diversity in relation to the 
concept of law, the role of law and the way conflicts should be managed. Taking this 
criticism on board would mean that it only makes sense to compare across the same 
family or legal culture. However, globalisation and transnational legal movements 
make this a rather untenable position and it might be more useful to understand legal 
culture not just from a purely legal but also from an anthropological perspective.  
 
The second approach towards understanding legal culture has been influenced by 
anthropology and in particular the work of Clifford Geertz
21
 and Lawrence Rosen
22
 
has been pivotal. Fellow anthropologist, Sally Engle Merry,
23
 gives a good overview 
of how interpretive anthropology has influenced the meaning of legal culture and 
what this means in the context of comparative law.  
 
Geertz conceptualises law not just as a bounded set of norms, rules and principles but 
as a cultural frame which can give meaning to the world. Law is seen as a set of 
cultural principles and categories in which culture refers to the symbols and meanings 
that constitute, communicate and change the meaning of the law. Given the 
importance of symbols and their meaning for law, comparative law is not about a 
functional comparison but requires a heuristic approach, according to Geertz.  
																																																						
20
 ibid., at 502-508.  
21
 C. Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (Basic Books, 1983). 
22
 L. Rosen, Law and Culture: An Invitation (Princeton University Press, 2006).  
23
 S. E. Merry, n. 19 above, at 59-60. 
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For Lawrence Rosen, to understand law requires linking it to wider cultural systems; 
law offers a deeper understanding in the larger culture but equally culture offers a 
frame of analysis to understand legal processes. For Rosen, law symbolises vernacular 
knowledge. Within this framework, comparing legal cultures requires examining the 
metaphors and cosmologies of legal systems, as well as the shared meanings of public 
symbolic systems within a social group.  
 
Both approaches have been criticised by, amongst others,
24
 Sally Engle Merry for 
conceptualising culture as a homogenous concept which extends the critique for 
seeing law as a relatively stable and unchanging legal and social sphere. In reality, 
law is more complex as it has been exposed to transfers, adaptations and 
hybridisations.
25
  
 
A third approach draws upon the work that is done in the area of sociolegal studies 
and is therefore heavily influenced by sociology. Lawrence FriedmanÕs
26
 work on 
legal culture has been very influential. Friedman has challenged the methodological 
approaches in comparative law and suggested that comparative law should align itself 
more closely with law and society studies as law is not an autonomous undertaking 
and is part of a wider social system.
27
 His critique was particularly aimed against the 
mainstream methods used in comparative law: comparative doctrinal analysis and 
system-level taxonomy. While the latter categorises legal systems according to shared 
																																																						
24
 For more critique, see the edited volume D. Nelken (ed.) n. 7 above.  
25
 S. E. Merry, n. 19 above, at 60. 
26
 L. Friedman, n. 17 above.  
27
 T. Ginsburg, ÔLawrence M. FriedmanÕs Comparative LawÕ, in R. Gordon (ed.), Law, Society and 
History: Essays on Themes in the Legal History and Legal Sociology of Lawrence M. Friedman (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Electronic copy available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1524745 
Vermeylen, S 2015, 'Comparative environmental law and orientalism: reading beyond the 'text' of traditional knowledge protection' Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, vol 24, no. 3, pp. 304-317
	 10	
and dominant legal characteristics, doctrinal analysis focuses on the relationship 
between doctrinal developments in different jurisdictions. Both approaches have been 
influenced by a scientific methodology. According to Friedman, law cannot be 
divorced from its social context, contrary to what is believed in orthodox comparative 
law that a legal rule can be separated from its social context in order for being 
transferable across borders. For Friedman, law is part of cultural norms which vary 
across different societies; legal culture is all about values, opinions, and beliefs about 
law that are shared in a community.
28
 However, Friedman is not interested in studying 
the particular, he still believes that legal culture can be studied at a general level 
across different traditional families of comparative law as the rule of law is not 
necessary Western in outlook but rather modern.  So Friedman sees similarities 
between the legal cultures of Germany, the Netherlands, Japan and the United States 
(to name a few) on the basis of the shared problems they face as industrial societies, 
and not so much on the basis of belonging to a Western legal family.  
 
The concept of legal culture has been criticised though by scholars working in the 
area of law and society and some have suggested different terminologies in an attempt 
to avoid seeing culture as a unity rather than an aggregate.
29
 For example, Roger 
Cotterell
30
 problematizes FriedmanÕs holistic use of the term legal culture and instead 
proposes the alternative concept of legal ideology; the latter being more related to 
doctrine. Susan Silbey
31
 acknowledges the difficulty in defining culture and therefore 
																																																						
28
 L. Friedman, Some Thoughts of the Rule of Law, legal Culture and Modernity in Comparative 
Perspective. Toward Comparative Law in the 21
st
 Century. (Tokyo, Chuo University Press, 
1998),1075-1090. 
29
 S. E. Merry, n. 19 above, at 53. 
30
 R. Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society: legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory (Ashgate, 2006)  
31
 S. Silbey, ÔAfter Legal ConsciousnessÕ, 1 Annual Review of Law and Social Science (2005), at 323. 
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urges using it in combination with the idea of legal consciousness
32
. This allows 
focusing on the micro dimensions of law making in everyday practice; paying 
particular attention to power relations and inequality in law-making processes.  
 
To summarise, legal anthropologists, like Sally Engle Merry, alert that legal 
comparatists might have misinterpreted the concept of culture, presenting it as 
integrated and relatively harmonious ideas and practices of a particular group, instead 
of seeing it more as actions, practices and beliefs that are relatively flexible and open 
to change.
33
 For anthropologists, cultures are not static but porous vessels, with ideas 
and practices that are constantly shifting. As Sally Engle Merry argues Ôculture 
provides the lens through which new institutions and practices are adopted and 
transformed.Õ
34
 [É] ÔCultural ideas are contested and connected to relations of power. 
Cultural repertoires include values and practices, ideas, and habits, and innovations 
along with commonsensical ways of doing things. They are typically plural, with 
contending ideas about many crucial areas of social life. Culture is the product of 
historical influences rather than evolutionary change. It is marked by hybridity and 
creolisation
35
, rather than uniformity or consistency. Local systems are embedded in 
national and transnational processes and particular historical trajectories. This is a 
more dynamic, agentic and historicised way of understanding culture. It emphasises 
																																																						
32
 In her paper, After Legal Consciousness, Silbey provides an in-depth genealogy of the meaning of 
legal consciousness in law and society studies and argues for a critical sociological understanding of 
legal consciousness; in broad terms Silbey conceptualizes legal consciousness as an analytical ÔtoolÕ 
that makes specific laws work better for particular groups or interests. It makes the relationship 
between consciousness, ideology and hegemony more transparent.   
33
	S. E. Merry, n. 19 above, at 54.	
34
	S. E. Merry, n. 19 above, at 54.	
35
 This should be interpreted as assimilation. 
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the active making of culture, society and institutions, and the grounding of this action 
in specific places and moments.Õ
36
   
 
Methodological and Epistemological Challenges for a Comparative Law 
Approach in Environmental Law 
 
Legrand
37
 criticised comparative lawÕs scholarship for merely comparing legal rules 
from different legislations to distil similarities and differences. This straightforward 
assessment of Ôlaw as rulesÕ lacks theoretical depth and some of the most fundamental 
questions relating to the ontology of law are absent. Different legal cultures might 
have a diverse understanding about the boundaries of the law and where law sits in a 
wider societal and normative context. After all, law is not created in a vacuum and is 
part of a broader context. In order to understand the foundations of the normative 
context of law a wider interdisciplinary study of law is needed drawing upon other 
disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. For Legrand the old category of 
legal families in comparative law is defunct and replaces it with the concept of legal 
mentalit interpreted as cognitive orders of legal systems.
38
 Zweigert and Ktz
39
 also 
want to push comparative law as a method beyond the boundaries of functionality and 
conceptualise it as a way of grasping legal styles. What it means is that an 
understanding of law requires more than only reading and interpreting statutory rules 
and judicial decisions. In order to apprehend law, it must be placed in a broader 
historical, socio-economic, cultural, political and even ideological context.   
 
																																																						
36
 S. E. Merry, n. 19 above, at 55. 
37
 P. Legrand, n. 10 above. 
38
 ibid.   
39
 K. Zweigert, H. Ktz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988). 
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Historically comparative law has its roots in positivism which ultimately is all about 
what counts as law. As a positivist discipline, comparative lawÕs role is to identify 
what counts as the law in force in other jurisdictions.
 40
 But for scholars like Legrand, 
this is not what comparative law should be about. For Legrand, comparative law is 
not just about a process of identification, it is rather a political act, especially when 
the comparative lawyer is dealing with foreign law.
41
 Comparative lawyers have the 
difficult task that they have to provide information of a legal culture whose language 
they not speak and whose legal institutions and codes have their own history with 
their own specific ideologies and self-image. Translating different legal cultures
42
 
comes with en ethical responsibility to recognise the difference of the other and a 
willingness to admit the limits of oneÕs own ÔlanguageÕ.
43
 Comparatists must not only 
try to read and understand this otherness (sometimes hidden in unexpressed codes) 
they must also convey forcefully this otherness to an audience that is equally not 
familiar with foreign law(s).
44
  This demands an approach that goes beyond 
functionalism, which is mainly focused on identifying universal problems shared by 
some societies and analysing how the different societies have solved the common 
problem; the legal solutions are functionally alike and hence comparable.
45
 Legrand, 
on the other hand, emphasises diversity, and comparative law should therefore 
research the fundamental differences and legal mentalities of different systems. 
																																																						
40
 P. Legrand, n. 8 above, at 603.  
41
 ibid., at 602 
42
 For more details about the importance to theorise about translation and the language of law, see the 
edited volume by S. Glanert, Comparative Law Ð Engaging Translation (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014).  
43
 M. Adams and D. Heirbaut, ÔProlegomena to the Method and Culture of Comparative Law, in M. 
Adams and D. Heirbaut (eds) The method and culture of comparative law: essays in honour of Mark 
Van Hoecke (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014), 1-21, at 7.  
44
 ibid., at 4. 
45
 T Ruskola, n. 6 above, at 188.  
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Methodologically, the approach then shifts to studying diversity and cultural 
originality of law.
46
  
 
For some, functionalism leads to en epistemological imperialism and a form of legal 
Orientalism.
47
 This means that we Ôeither [É] find in foreign legal cultures 
confirmation of the (projected) universality of our own legal categories, or, equally 
troublingly, we find ÒproofÓ of the fact that other legal cultures lack some aspect or 
other of our law.Õ
48
 Orientalism as a concept is related to postcolonial discussion, and 
has its roots in the work of the postcolonial literary scholar Edward Said,
49
 who 
coined the term to refer to the OccidentÕs constructed discourses of the Orient to form 
an opinion of the East. This has reduced the Orient to a passive object that can only be 
known by a cognitively privileged subject Ð the West.
50
 Understanding comparative 
law through a postcolonial lens means that Western legal cultures are no longer used 
as a benchmark from which to study other legal cultures. ÔAccordingly, attempts are 
made to give the constitutive other in law a voice of its own.Õ
51
 This requires from 
comparatists to start a conversation with critical theory, a challenge that Legrand has 
aptly taken on in his work on Derrida and comparative law.
52
 
 
The Relationship between Self and Other in Comparative Law 
  
																																																						
46
 J. Husa, ÔResearch Designs of Comparative Law Ð Methodology or Heuristics?Õ, in: M. Adams and 
D. Heirbaut (eds.) n. 40, 53-68, at 64.   
47
 T. Ruskola, n. 6 above; J. Husa, n. 46 above, at 64. 
48
 T. Ruskola, n. 6 above, at 190. 
49
 E. Said Orientalism. (London, penguin Books, 1978).  
50
 T. Ruskola, n. 6 above, at 192.  
51
 J, Husa, n. 43 at 64.   
52
 P. Legrand, n. 8 above; P. Legrand, ÔParadoxically, Derrida: For a Comparative Legal StudiesÕ, 27 
Cardoza Law Review (2005-2006) 631-717. 
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As one of the main methodological and epistemological challenges in comparative 
law is the interpretation of foreign law texts, it is not a surprise then that Pierre 
Legrand has sought inspiration in the work of the French philosopher Jacques Derrida 
who has dedicated his academic career to studying the relationship between self and 
other, ethnocentricity and otherness in texts. Legrand uses DerridaÕs work to construct 
a more sophisticated understanding of texts against the background of a relationship 
between self and other.
53
  Given LegrandÕs successful dialogue between comparative 
law and DerridaÕs work, I will rely mainly on LegrandÕs interpretation of DerridaÕs 
original work.
54
   
 
For Derrida, the reading of a text starts indeed conventionally with acknowledging the 
authorship on the surface of the text, but Derrida adds very quickly that giving 
meaning to the text requires a double gesture. Undeniably what is visible on the page 
gives important meaning and presence to the text, but grammatical and philological 
substance is not all there is. Another meaning can be present as text even though it 
may not graphically be visible. For Derrida, a text compromises a visible and invisible 
dimension, and it is the invisible aspect that allows the embracing of the other in the 
text: the text is not the book Ð it is not limited to the book: it compromises and does 
not therefore exclude the world, it embraces the other.
55
 Derrida refers to the 
imperceptible element as a trace in the sense of a sign or clue. So apart from visible 
graphical features, for Derrida a text has an infinite assemblage of traces. These traces 
are not visible to the interpreter of the text but they haunt the text. Consciously 
Derrida uses the word haunting to make us aware that the invisible traces in the text 
																																																						
53
 Pierre Legrand engages mainly with J. DerridaÕs work De La Grammatologie and refers to the 
original French edition of 1967 by de Minuit.  
54
 P. Legrand, n. 8 above 
55
 J. Derrida, n. 52 above, at 253 in P. Legrand , n. 8 above, at 606.  
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are ghosts, they are present but not visible. Importantly, the traces are signs or clues 
that are left behind by history, politics or philosophy; Derrida calls these deposits 
ashes or cinders.
56
 The traces though that are left behind are retentional; this is typical 
Derridean leitmotif to imply that what remains and gets repeated in the text (invisibly) 
is a Ôrepetition-with-a-differenceÕ. The trace is a left behind of the power they 
represent, but it is not colossal or monumental and stable, on the contrary it is 
unstable and transient. In DerridaÕs words: traces are Ôdeath strolls between the 
lettersÕ.
57
  
 
In legal terms what Derrida shows is Ôthe spectral structure of the lawÕ; what legal 
positivists (and this includes indeed some comparatists) consider being outside the 
structure of the text Ð i.e. law Ð is, as a matter of fact, not to be exterior to it or absent 
from it. The spectrality of the law makes it per definition relational Ô[to] the living 
present to its outside, the openness upon exteriority [É], upon the non-self.Õ
58
 As the 
traces are invisible, they await their revealing by the textÕs interpreter who in his task 
of elucidation must engage with the opposite of amnesia, as s/he decodes they must 
remember collectively the traces. This gesture or what Derrida calls Ôthe staging of 
the tracesÕ resembles a performative dimension. The life of the law-text can only be 
unearthed when traces are remembered as survivancies. But even when traces are 
unveiled the full textÕs presence will never be discovered.  
 
For Derrida, the interpreter is an inventor, meaning that s/he is both a finder and a 
creator. How does Legrand apply this thinking to comparative law? ÔIt is the 
comparativist-at-law who, by going underground in order to explore the textÕs 
																																																						
56
 J. Derrida, Feu La Cendre at 27 (ditions des femmes 1987) in P. Legrand, n. 8, at 607. 
57
 J. Derrida, lÕ criture et la difference, at 108 (Le Seuil 1967) in P. Legrand, n. 8 above, at 607. 
58
 J.Derrida, voix supra note 21 at 96 in P. Legrand, n. 8 above, at 609. 
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rhizomes, awakens meaning, brings the traces into interpretive existence, makes the 
traces actively mean, attributes dynamic meaning to them, acts as an enabler of 
resonant meaning, makes the traces meaning-ful.Õ
59
 For Legrand, this means that as an 
interpreter, the comparatist can rely on prejudice defined as a pre-understanding, it 
allows the comparatist to leave her/his signature on foreign law or what Legrand 
refers to as an autobiographical inscription.
60
 However, this is not without its own 
problems, as Derrida argues the moment we give meaning to something, we commit 
violence to it.  
 
To summarise what we have established so far, Ôthe traces haunting the words of the 
statute or of the judicial decision can be understood as telling us more about the law 
than an exegesis of these words themselves can ever do.Õ
61
  This does not mean, 
however, that we have to discard the graphical dimension of the text. Statutes and 
judicial decisions remain important to the study of the comparatist in a positivistic 
sense; tracing then is a radicalised version of legal positivism. When the comparatist 
embarks on inventing the traces in the law-text, it is important to acknowledge that 
the meaning of the text is always postponed, when a trace is found, it is not fully 
present, as the trace itself can be traced to another trace. As Derrida argues Ôthere is 
no atom.Õ
62
 However, there is another reason why no definite meaning can be found 
in the text because textual meaning will differ with each interpreter. The structure of 
the text, which is never fully present, and the structure of the interpretation, which is 
never identical, makes it impossible to fix a meaning in the text. Derrida refers to this 
phenomenon as diffrance, signifying that the meaning of the text is indefinitely-
																																																						
59
 P. Legrand, n. 8 above, at 610 
60
 ibid., 611 
61
 ibid., 612 
62
 J. Derrida point de suspension 147 Elisabeth Weber ed. Galile 1992 in P. Legrand, n. 8 above, at 
614.  
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deferred and ever-different; it is always to come.
63
 This means that there cannot be an 
accurate translation or legal transplant of foreign law. Translation cannot therefore 
erase difference; on the contrary, it intensifies it.  
 
For Derrida, here lies the Ôcruel law of differenceÕ: there is no outlook for an 
agreement, comparatists keep meeting their own failure to meet the other. What the 
comparatist can achieve is to engage with a strategy of re-presentation. Justice lies not 
in sameness, but in the recognition and respect of difference. This means that for the 
Ô[c]omparativists-at-law, who concern themselves with otherness, are asked to accept 
their hyper-responsibility vis--vis the trace-as-other must regulate the justice and the 
justness of their behaviour, of their theoretical, practical, and ethico-politica 
decisions, to acknowledge that this ineluctable commitment, this indebtedness arising 
from a debt which cannot be cancelled (the other is there and remains there), demands 
an appreciation allowing for the other lawÕs irreplaceable singularity.Õ
64
  
 
To conclude, what can be learned from Derrida is first that there is more to a text than 
meets the eye/I. Second, it is the responsibility of the compararist-at-law to trace the 
hidden meaning of the text in order to interrupt the repression of otherness that has 
been endorsed by legal positivism, accepting though that this interpretation never 
finishes Ôthere is always more instantiation, more unpresentability, more 
intermittence, more playÕ Ð with no prospect for closure.
65
  The comparatist must 
answer the call to move away from the politics of sameness and move towards an 
embracement of otherness, which has summoned the comparatist to act.   
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 P. Legrand, n. 8 above, at 615-616. 
64
 ibid., at 622. 
65
 ibid., at 623. 
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As mentioned already in the introduction, legal scholars and lawyers must act upon 
this call to embrace legal plurality and alternative perceptions of legal norms, values 
and justice in the area of traditional knowledge protection and indigenous peoplesÕ 
self-determination rights. As international human rights increasingly recognises 
indigenous peoplesÕ customary laws and institutions, the judiciary will progressively 
be under pressure to recognise and enforce customary law in the countries where 
traditional knowledge custodians reside but also equally in the countries where 
indigenous peoplesÕ knowledge is being used (these are often countries with advanced 
research and the technological and financial capacity to develop new products in 
cosmetics, pharmaceutical, agro-industrial and biotechnology industry
66
).
67
The 
concept of legal pluralism faces a challenge that goes well beyond an ordinary 
acceptance of the co-existence of different legal regimes. Recognition of customary 
law requires a deeper reading of legal texts, for one thing it will require the 
acceptance that Eurocentric and positivist law has a history of subordinating ÔotherÕ 
legal systems.
68
 As Tobin argues: ÔRecognition of a vast multiplicity of customary 
law regimes will require flexibility, sensitivity, imagination and, above all, respect for 
its place amongst the sources of law that form part of a global intercultural and 
pluralistic order.Õ
69
 What Legrand asks the comparatist to do when judging foreign 
law is to be aware of the historical Ôpredatory legalityÕ
70
 that has subordinated 
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customary law when Western law was imposed upon local systems at the time of 
colonial conquest. If national and foreign law and policy will have to incorporate 
indigenous peoplesÕ customary law, they will have to be aware of the historical legal 
violence when building bridges between international, national and indigenous 
peoplesÕ legal regimes.
71
 This requires a proper and actual engagement with the 
somewhat abstract notion of reading beyond the text; how this can be done, will be 
illustrated later in this article. But before this article will deconstruct the traces of 
international environmental law in relation to traditional knowledge protection, it first 
needs to engage with a functional comparative approach.  
 
Traditional Knowledge: A Comparison of Different Laws 
 
In order to address the issue how traditional knowledge can be legally protected, it is 
important to find out first how it has been defined in emerging legal systems. 
Subsequently, the paper will look into regional, national and international laws in 
relation to sui generis protection mechanisms.  
 
There is no official or agreed definition of traditional knowledge. The CBD avoids a 
definition altogether, adopting the phrase in Artile 8(j) Ôknowledge, innovations and 
practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestylesÕ.
72
 
																																																																																																																																																											
Baxi, ÔThe Colonialist HeritageÕ, in P. Legrand and R. Munday (eds), Comparative Legal Studies: 
Traditions and Transitions. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 46-75, at 46.  
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 B. Tobin, n.70 above, at 114. 
72
 Article 8(j) states Each contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate: Subject to 
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The WIPO secretariat uses a working definition that is similar to other approaches in 
international fora and defines traditional knowledge as:  Ôtradition-based literary, 
artistic or scientific works; performances; inventions; scientific discoveries; designs; 
marks and symbols; undisclosed information; and all other tradition-based 
innovations and creations resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial, 
scientific, literary or artistic fields.Õ
73
 One of the biggest concerns about this definition 
of traditional knowledge is that it has mainly been drafted by people who are most 
interested in intellectual property rights, but indigenous peoples and local 
communities may not want to protect their knowledge for commercial purposes. 
Often their demand for better protection mechanisms are driven by their dependence 
on traditional knowledge systems for their cultural and physical survival and are not 
necessarily linking their demands to the remit of the CBD on sustainability and 
biodiversity conservation either.
74
 Furthermore, the WIPO definition of traditional 
knowledge implies that traditional knowledge is a negative category as it suggests that 
it includes a broad category of knowledges having in common that they are currently 
not being protected by intellectual property rights laws.
75
                                                                                     
 
For indigenous peoples, the struggle to get protection of rights over traditional 
knowledge is linked to the wider struggle of self-determination rights.
76
 This requires, 
first, participation of indigenous peoples in law making, and second, respect for their 
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 O. B. Arewa, ÔTRIPs and Traditional Knowledge: Local Communities, Local Knowledge, and 
Global Intellectual Property FrameworksÕ 10 Marq. Intel. Prop. L. Rev., (2006) 164-180, at 155.   
76
 Brendan Tobin, Indigenous Peoples, Customary Law and Human Rights Ð Why Living Law Matters 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), at 157. 
Vermeylen, S 2015, 'Comparative environmental law and orientalism: reading beyond the 'text' of traditional knowledge protection' Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, vol 24, no. 3, pp. 304-317
	 22	
customs and customary laws.
77
 Both these requirements point to the rather precarious 
issue of different world views of indigenous and Euro-Anglo-American law. This 
problem has been discussed at great length for a few decades and so far the focus has 
been on understanding the tension between formal law of modern society, as 
expressed in intellectual property rights and biodiversity conservation, and the so-
called informal legal systems of indigenous and local communities. But the legal 
issues surrounding traditional knowledge are complex because they touch upon wider 
issues such as sovereignty, self-determination rights and human rights.
78
  
 
Therefore it is recognised that it is important to develop a separate instrument in tune 
with indigenous peoplesÕ and local communitiesÕ culture and customs.
79
 Alternative 
solutions range from traditional resource rights, community rights legislations, 
disclosure of origin in patent application, model laws, national sui generis regimes 
and the development of biocultural protocols by indigenous peoples and local 
communities themselves. In each of these alternative suggestions, customary law 
plays a prominent role. A sui generis system is a regulatory regime that incorporates 
the relevant customs and customary laws in binding law. Presently, no internationally 
binding sui generis regime exist, but related regional and national instruments have 
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been developed as part of national governmentsÕ wider obligation to comply with the 
CBD as will be discussed further hereafter.  
 
As detailed by Paul Kuruk,
80
 one of the earliest regional sui generis instruments on 
traditional knowledge is the African Model Law for the Protection of the Rights of 
Local Communities, Farmers, Breeders and Regulation of Access to Biological 
Resources (African Model Law)
81
 adopted by the Council of Ministers of the 
Organisation of African Unity in June 1998. Article 16 of the African Model Law 
recognises the rights of communities over their innovations, practices, knowledge, 
and technologies acquired through generations. It also acknowledges their right to 
collectively benefit from the utilisation of such resources. These community rights 
must be protected in accordance with norms, practices and customary law found in, 
and recognised by, the concerned local and indigenous communities, whether such 
law is written or not. Article 23 of the African Model Law recognises "community 
intellectual rights," which are defined to include those rights held by traditional 
professional groups, especially traditional intellectual property practitioners. To be 
granted access to biological resources and traditional knowledge, prior informed 
consent and written permission must have been granted by local communities. Similar 
approaches relating to a sui generis protection regime for traditional knowledge can 
also be found in the Model Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and 
Expressions of Culture in the Pacific Region (Pacific Model Law)
82
 and the Andean 
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region with Decision 486 (The Decision)
83
 on a Common Intellectual Property 
Regime adopted by the Andean Community in 2000. Most of the Model Laws are 
modelled after the provisions in the CBD and envisage a contractual agreement 
between indigenous communities and users of traditional knowledge as the main 
mechanism for achieving prior informed consent and access and benefit sharing 
principles.
84
  
 
On a national level, most sui generis measures for traditional knowledge combine two 
basic legal concepts to govern the use of traditional knowledge: first, the regulation of 
access to traditional knowledge, and second, the grant of exclusive rights for 
traditional knowledge.
85
 Most measures, which are adopted and implemented, fall 
either in an intellectual property framework or access and benefit-sharing agreement. 
In this paper, for the comparative component, a sub-selection of the countries that 
have been selected by WIPO will be used.
 86
 These countries have been selected on 
the basis of the major sui generis measures and laws they have undertaken so far. In 
terms of access regulation most countries have specific access and benefit sharing 
agreements in place. However, with regard to intellectual property legislation, 
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recognition of indigenous rights and repression of unfair competition, only Peru has 
appropriate measures in place with the exception of the Philippines which also 
recognises indigenous rights. It is also Peru and the Philippines recognising explicitly 
customary law as a policy tool to recognise protection of traditional knowledge.
87
 As 
reported indeed by Brendan Tobin, to date the most comprehensive regime for 
protection on Indigenous peoplesÕ rights is in Peru which adopted Law 27811 in 
August 2002 for protection of the collective rights of Indigenous peoples over 
traditional knowledge relating to biological diversity.
88
 
Generic principles that can be distilled from the above examples of national laws are: 
the recognition that indigenous groups own or have rights of custodianship over 
indigenous resources; this confirms that indigenous groups have primacy rights whilst 
the State has just secondary rights over traditional knowledge; such rights are 
determined with reference to customary practices and not laid down by State rules; 
model laws allow exceptions to established intellectual property rights criteria where 
necessary to effectively protect traditional knowledge; model laws allow protection of 
traditional knowledge based on written or other (i.e. oral) evidence; and the duration 
of rights over traditional knowledge are indefinite.
89
 In short, the regional and 
national model laws fulfil some of the criteria as specified by indigenous peoples as 
preferred method for the protection of traditional knowledge and differ significantly 
from existing intellectual property laws which indigenous peoples and local 
communities perceive as inappropriate protection mechanisms.  
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However, as highlighted by Karolina Kuprecht,
90
 the development of an international 
sui generis system is not comparable to the regional and national model laws in terms 
of the challenges that it may face. First, it will be difficult for an international system 
to incorporate a diversity of indigenous customs and customary laws. Second, the 
development of a sui generis system incorporating Euro-Anglo-American law and 
customs and customary law of indigenous peoples may result in misinterpreting the 
latter. Thirdly, a well-developed sui generis system may be too rigid and static. 
Finally, there might be a danger that a sui generis system is still too much top down 
even if indigenous peoplesÕ customs and customary law has been incorporated, this 
might still be orchestrated from the top with insufficient respect for tribal structures of 
governance and law making. Against the background of these challenges it seems 
more appropriate to focus on general principles and norms of customary law rather 
than to attempt the full integration and implementation of customary law. Given these 
challenges, as illustrated below, both the CBD and WIPO have so far failed to deliver 
on a ÔproperÕ sui generis system on an international level.  
 
Customary law specialist, Brendan Tobin has provided a useful overview on the latest 
developments on sui generis regimes in the two most important international 
instruments Ð the CBD and WIPO.
91
  
 
The importance of customary law in the process of protecting traditional knowledge 
was reaffirmed in the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and Sharing 
of Benefits Arising from their Utilisation in October 2010. Although the Protocol 
does not grant direct property rights over traditional knowledge it does, however, 
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create obligation for Parties to provide necessary arrangements so indigenous peoples 
have extensive rights to control access and use of their knowledge. For example, 
article 7 of the Protocol creates obligations for both countries in which indigenous 
peoples reside and into which their traditional knowledge may be imported, to adopt 
measures to secure indigenous peoplesÕ rights over their traditional knowledge. 
Customary law plays a role at the point of access and point of use. However, 
indigenous peoples will still face a battle with national states implementing the 
Protocol in national laws.   A case in point has been the failure of the European 
UnionÕs draft legislative proposal for implementation of the Protocol to fully 
acknowledge customary law (in addition to other disappointing measures).
92
  
 
In addition, article 12 requires states implementing the Protocol, to take into 
consideration indigenous peoples customary law and community protocols. While this 
requirement makes the Protocol the first international binding instrument to recognise 
formally the extraterritorial reach of indigenous peoplesÕ and local peoplesÕ 
customary law, it comes with the challenge of creating a platform that allows an 
effective communication and translation of different legal norms and procedures. The 
biggest hurdle is to guarantee that positivist law institutions, such as national courts, 
are fully equipped to interpret and implement in a fair, equitable and respectful 
manner customary law. As will be discussed in more detail in the concluding part of 
this paper, this is precisely the point where comparative lawyers can play an 
important role.  
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WIPO through its Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property, Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC), regulates intellectual property 
issues emerging from the use of traditional knowledge. The ICG, established in 2000, 
took initially a rather hopeful holistic approach but as time went on has caused 
disappointment for several reasons. First, it distinguishes between traditional 
knowledge, folklore and traditional cultural expressions, a division rarely made by 
indigenous peoples. Second, it allows for exemptions for any act permissible under 
national law of a contracting party, for knowledge protected by patent, trade secrets 
and for material protected by copyright law.
93
 This makes indigenous peoplesÕ laws 
and customs relating to their traditional knowledge and cultural expressions 
secondary to intellectual property law.  
 
Up until 2009 the WIPO IGC focused on developing a sui generis misappropriation 
regime incorporating recognition and respecting customary law and its role in 
protection of traditional knowledge. The 2011 version of the IGC draft Objectives and 
Principles expanded on these provisions and arranged that entitlements to share in 
benefits should be guided by the customary practices and laws of indigenous peoples 
and local communities.
94
  
 
All along WIPO was sending out messages in, for example, its issue paper on 
customary law in 2006, that it recognised the importance of customary law as the 
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basis for protecting traditional knowledge.
95
 It also dealt with one of the more thorny 
issues of capacity building of national courts and administrative bodies so they could 
accept, interpret and enforce in an appropriate manner evidence of customary-law 
based rights and duties.
96
  
 
However, this sense of cautious optimism changed drastically in April 2013, days 
before IGC 24, when all references to customary law and its role in defining 
traditional knowledge, guiding benefit sharing and delimiting rights of custodianship, 
was deleted from the negotiating texts.
97
 The text of traditional knowledge that came 
out of IGC 24 (22 to 26 April 2013) fixated mainly on the development of a system of 
exclusive proprietary rights for protection of traditional knowledge to be granted by 
states. As Tobin so aptly comments, Òthere was little sui generis about the proposal, 
which in essence proposed a new form of intellectual property protection, the very 
thing [i]ndigenous peoples had opposed from the outsetÓ.
98
 Furthermore, the draft 
articles also suggested a misappropriation regime based upon state obligations to 
prevent unapproved and uncompensated use of traditional knowledge in specific 
circumstances. The suggested proprietary regime was nothing close to what 
indigenous peoples and local communities envisaged as a protection mechanism as it 
could drastically change the unique non-proprietary character of traditional 
knowledge systems. In addition, the misappropriation regime makes indigenous 
peoplesÕ dependent on the capacity and willingness of the state to recognize 
indigenous peoplesÕ and local communitiesÕ rights. It is very unlikely that these 
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ÔvulnerableÕ groups will be in a position to control their rights and take it to the courts 
if they would notice a violation of their rights.  
 
After 15 years of ICG sessions, indigenous and local communities can only but 
remark that the CommitteeÕs work to date has been developed without a meaningful 
participation of indigenous peoples and local communities.
99
 The greatest criticism of 
all is that indigenous peoples and local communities cannot adequately participate in 
the negotiations that will define their international intellectual property rights.
100
 
Despite non-governmental organisationsÕ (NGOs) and indigenous groupsÕ status as 
observers in IGC session, they cannot vote, neither can they present proposals, 
amendments or motions.
101
 These limitations are further exacerbated as a result of 
their politically marginalized position and economically weak position. Consequently, 
their voice is barely heard or fairly represented in WIPO and the IGC. Another major 
concern is the unwillingness of some industrialised countries, mainly the United 
States (US) and Japan, to think constructively about a final outcome and the general 
indisposition to consider indigenous and other local communitiesÕ rights and views in 
the negotiations.
102
   
 
To summarise, despite the lengthy negotiations in WIPO and the recent developments 
in the Nagoya Protocol, indigenous peoples and local communities are still facing the 
challenge to get recognition and enforcement capacities for their customary laws and 
customs when discussing appropriate protection mechanisms for traditional 
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knowledge. Acknowledgement of customary law is one of the principles that matters 
most for indigenous peoples and local communities given the intrinsic relationship 
between law and identity in indigenous cultures. For indigenous and local 
communities it is clear that international standards should and must provide for a 
regime that recognizes customary law that is enforceable across borders.  While the 
IGC has initially tried to respond to such requests, more recent developments point in 
the opposite direction and achieving effective recognition and enforcement of their 
customary laws remains a major challenge for indigenous peoples and local 
communities. Despite recent attempts by WIPO to rekindle the discussions on 
traditional knowledge
103
 in the aftermath of the failure to agree on the work to be 
done on traditional knowledge in the last general assembly (1 October 2014), legal 
connoisseurs are not hopeful that the WIPO ICGÕs position will drastically change. It 
is very likely that WIPOÕs position will continue to develop in the opposite direction 
of general human rights instruments, the latter recognizing the importance of the role 
of customary law for indigenous peoplesÕ self-determination rights.
104
 In the 
unlikelihood of a sui generis system under the auspices of the WIPO ICG, indigenous 
peoples will have to rely on alternative mechanisms provided in human rights law, the 
Nagoya Protocol and customary international law to control whether using their 
traditional knowledge complies with their customary laws. It is up to alternative 
dispute mechanisms, including national courts in foreign jurisdictions, to ensure that 
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failure to respect customary law will result to loss of rights to use the traditional 
knowledge for research and development. It is important though to emphasise again 
that just recognition of customary law will not necessarily translate into a respectful 
and Ôfaithful applicationÕ of customary law.
105
  
 
This is where comparative lawyers could play a role by assuming their critical 
responsibility to construct meaning beyond the text.   
 
Concluding Thoughts: Reading Beyond the Text 
 
Comparative environmental lawyers should be more aware in their analysis that 
international environmental treaties often lack empathy about the lawÕs functioning in 
a postcolonial societal context.
106
 Just like law in general, environmental law has and 
can be an instrument of power that plays an important role in colonial and 
postcolonial relations. As long as customary law is not fully recognised and caught up 
in translation issues and problems of legal transplantation across different legal 
cultures, international environmental law can still be accused for providing the master 
narrative that not only frames law, but also scaffolds and structures economic, social 
and political relations in societies. In a Foucauldian sense, international 
environmental law provides the conduit to regulate panoptic relations of 
domination.
107
 Particularly, international instruments like WIPO and CBD in 
comparison to regional and national protocols, illustrate that the discourses of 
international environmental law are mainly Ôconcerned with the discourses and 
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strategies of institutionalised power informing elitesÕ perpetuation of their position 
and their hierarchical relations with civil society.
108
  
 
A good example of this is the way traditional knowledge is being conceptualised in 
international instruments, such as the CBD and WIPO. Tensions exist in international 
instruments how to define terms like traditional knowledge indicating how these 
terms are embedded in historical, political and cultural differences that persist 
between and within indigenous groups and the international community.
109
 As 
mentioned earlier, the focus is clearly on proprietary protection driven by a 
commercial need to protect traditional knowledge. However, engaging with LegrandÕs 
work and his reading of Derrida, traces of power and imperialism could be discovered 
when giving meaning to ÔtextsÕ. As well established in the fields of anthropology and 
science and technology studies, but barely touched upon in comparative and 
environmental law, traditional knowledge has become a scapegoat for many 
practitioners and academics for either disrupting development or on the other end of 
the spectre perceived as a panacea for saving the environment and biodiversity 
conservation.
110
 This framing is mainly driven by a wider discourse of an 
epistemological difference between local and scientific knowledge. However, recent 
trends in post-colonial theory, feminist studies or post-structuralism have made it 
clear that such an absolutist dichotomy plays an important part in Western 
philosophical thinking to justify a discriminatory representation of the other (in this 
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context local knowledge systems).
111
 It has its roots in Cartesian thinking and makes 
it possible to divide the world in a category of subjects who know and objects who are 
to be known. However, all knowledges are constructed and context-dependent, Ôthus 
the focus of analysis should be on those processes that legitimise certain hierarchies 
of knowledge and power between local and global (scientific) knowledges.Õ
112
 
Intellectual property rights are still one of the strongest impetuses in the debate on 
traditional knowledge protection, but intellectual property rights are a symbol of a 
worldview that sees scientific knowledge as the paradigm of knowledge.
113
 However, 
it is not only the discursive power of science that needs deconstructing, Western 
scientific knowledge also co-constituted (including in the material sense) 
colonialism.
114
    
 
International law does play a role in legitimising dominant epistemologies and 
ontologies. ÔDuring imperial colonial rule, such legal narratives rationalised the 
imposition of civilised legal orders on so-called primitive and underdeveloped 
colonies.Õ
115
 More recently, legal doctrines have been transferred to the global South 
through aid and development projects under the auspices of the United Nations 
system and other international treaties and agreements. It is important for 
environmental lawyers and comparatists to remember that the agreements that are in 
put in place for the protection of traditional knowledge are part of this politicized 
relationship. As one of the most renowned legal experts in this field admits, Ôthere is a 
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growing body of international law that seeks to clarify the legal uncertainties, but in 
practice only seem to exacerbate themÕ.
116
  The main reason for much of that 
confusion is that economic discourses are being intertwined with new environmental 
planning ideologies of which the CBD is a prime example.
117
  
 
Biodiversity-rich countries realising the economic potential of their biogenetic 
resources and using them for pulling in technology and scientific transfers have 
asserted their sovereign rights to control ultimately access to biogenetic resources. 
Adoption of the sovereignty principle in the CBD has been presented as a clear 
victory for biodiversity-rich countries, but for the custodians of traditional knowledge 
and biogenetic resources (i.e. indigenous peoples and local communities) the deal has 
been somewhat raw.
118
 In a Derridean sense, this shortcoming lies mainly beyond the 
grammatical text and can be traced back to 16
th
 century Europe and the thought that a 
nation state has the right to permanent sovereignty over their territories and natural 
resources.
119
 The CBD explicitly upholds this rights in its preamble when stating that 
Ôstates have sovereign rights over their own biological resourcesÕ.   
 
Taking the example of the WIPO IGC, the most affected people Ð i.e. indigenous 
peoples and local communities Ð were just observers in the negotiations and were not 
able to participate in a meaningful way in what has been framed as the most important 
negotiation about an effective instrument to effectively protect traditional 
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knowledge.
120
 The CBD and the national access and benefit sharing laws are focusing 
much more on contractual agreements which require equitable partnerships.
121
 This 
opens up a debate about power relations in these negotiations and the outcome may 
vary depending on: what induces parties to negotiate; the negotiation strengths and 
weaknesses of the parties; and whether there is clear national legislation regarding 
ownership of resources.
122
 Furthermore, there are strong indications that access and 
benefit sharing laws have been developed faster in those countries where highly 
visible biodiversity prospecting activities have led to increased public interest and 
national debate such as Costa Rica and Peru.
123
 National sovereignty issues might 
have been more prominent on the mind of the respective government negotiators than 
the respect and recognition of indigenous peoplesÕ self-determination rights. Most of 
the national access and benefit sharing laws have been criticised for the fact that they 
pay more attention to the establishment, regulation, facilitation and commercialisation 
of traditional knowledge rather than to the recuperation, consolidation and 
strengthening of traditional knowledge; the latter being more important for indigenous 
peoples than the former.
124
  
 
The lack of indigenous peoplesÕ direct or indirect participation is simultaneously a 
sign but also adds further to a political marginalisation of indigenous groups and 
raises issues of fairness, equity and global justice.
125
 The exclusion of indigenous 
peoples from negotiations on an equal footing is again a sign of continuous colonial 
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practices. According to the feminist postcolonial scholar Spivak, marginalised people 
cannot speak with an authentic voice as they have been reduced to subjects by 
colonial powers and their voice is a reconstruction based on the terms and rules that 
the colonisers have reconstructed.
126
 The colonial relations between international law 
and indigenous peoples can be followed through a link to the work of Francisco de 
Vitoria, a sixteenth-century Spanish theologian and jurist who in his two famous 
lectures, De Indis Noviter Inventis and De Jure Bellis Hispanorum in Barbaros, 
reflected upon the relations between Spain and the Indians and in particularly was 
preoccupied with questions such as: who is sovereign and what are the powers of the 
sovereign and are the Indians sovereign?  
 
The sovereignty doctrine emerged in the work of Vitoria when he addressed the 
problem of cultural difference when he encountered the problem of having to create a 
system of law that could regulate and govern the relations between societies that 
belonged to different cultural orders each with their own ideas of governance and 
propriety.
127
 Vitoria assesses the cultural practices of each society against the 
universal law of jus gentium and demonstrates that the Indians violate universal 
natural law. Hence, Indians can only be admitted to the legal system through 
disciplinary powers. Vitoria overemphasises the difference and portrays him as 
barbaric, backward and uncivilised to justify sanctions against the Indian because the 
Indian refuses to comply with universal standards. Ultimately, this difference and 
refusal to comply with universal rules justifies Ôthe disciplinary measures of war, 
directed toward effacing Indian identity and replacing it with the universal identity of 
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the Spanish.Õ
128
 For critical legal scholars there is a dark side to the notion of 
sovereignty and unlike the mainstream view that the sovereignty doctrine has its roots 
in Western European history, a more complex and critical reading of VitoriaÕs work 
suggests that sovereignty as a concept has clear links with colonialism. VitoriaÕs 
construction of a set of arguments emphasising, first, a difference between the Indians 
and Spanish in terms of their social practices and customs in international law; 
second, an attempt to bridge this difference through characterising the Indian as 
someone who possesses reason and therefore should be bound to jus gentium; and 
finally, a justification of disciplining the Indian because of his backward status refuses 
to comply with universal reason, is still being used today in international law to 
suppress the non-Western world.
129
 Arguably, Ônon-European peoples have been 
continuously characterised as the barbarians compelling the further extension of 
international lawÕs ambit.
130
    
 
To conclude, the indeterminate legal status of indigenous peoples and their traditional 
knowledge systems is particularly pertinent in international (environmental) legal 
instruments. Indigenous peoples and their knowledge systems are still attributed with 
distinctive characteristics that puts them in a Ôlocation outside of modernityÕ.
131
 Law 
inscribes cultural difference and as Pierre Legrand so aptly argues it is the 
responsibility of the comparatist-at-law to deconstruct the locality of law so it can 
travel; leaving local laws to stand in juxtaposition to universal laws is not an 
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option.
132
 When taking up this challenge, comparative law might discover that it can 
be surprisingly Ôhospitable to other kinds of knowledge.
133
 Comparatists have focused 
for too long on either the unification of laws limited to proximate jurisdictions or 
aspire to a universal uniform law. In both instances difference is not explained but it 
is rather contained or even erased.
134
 While there is still a long road ahead to full 
recognition of customary law in international and national law, a range of options are 
emerging for indigenous peoplesÕ to enforce respect for their legal customs, norms, 
and values. Tobin lists a series of opportunities ranging from empowerment of 
traditional decision making authorities to extension of indigenous peoplesÕ 
jurisdiction.
135
 But whether national judicial capacity to apply customary law is raised 
or indigenous experts are included in judicial processes through the establishment of 
mixed judicial bodies, success of these measures will depend to what extent 
customary law is not going to be incorporated in a totalising system of universality. 
ÔComparative legal studies must recognise and lay out a space of the other within the 
law.Õ
136
 This means that comparative lawyers can help the judiciary in tracing the 
uniqueness of customary law, its history, occasion, place, and indeed its difference.  
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